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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2587 
_____________ 
 
DAN A. DRUZ, 
 
                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
VALERIE NOTO;  
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY; 
JOHN DOE 1-5;  JANE DOE 1-5 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-09-cv-05040) 
District Judge: Hon. Freda L. Wolfson 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 15, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed March 2, 2011) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT       
__________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Dan Druz, an attorney admitted to the bar and proceeding pro se, 
appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his Complaint for failure to state a claim. 
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We write primarily for the parties and accordingly our role is limited to error-correcting, 
with the understanding that the parties are familiar with the facts and proceedings on the 
trial level. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court.
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The District Court dismissed Druz’s Complaint on multiple grounds. It held that 
Defendants New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety (“NJDLPS”) and Deputy 
Attorney General Valerie Noto (“DAG Noto”) in her official capacity (the “State 
Defendants”) were entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The Court held 
that DAG Noto was entitled to grievant and witness immunity in both her official and 
personal capacity. In the alternative, the Court determined that Druz’s § 1983 claims (1) 
did not reach the State Defendants, because they were not “persons” within the meaning 
of § 1983, (2) did not allege a violation of a constitutional provision, (3) failed to allege a 
special grievance, and (4) were barred by the statute of limitations. The Court 
additionally held that Druz’s state law claims failed to comply with the notice provisions 
of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:1-1, et seq. (West 2010). 
Druz contests all aspects of the Court’s ruling. 
We will affirm the District Court on the bases of sovereign immunity and 
grievant/witness immunity, although we note that the Court’s analysis of the other 
grounds is sound. 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of a 
motion to dismiss. E.g., Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010). We 
exercise plenary review over a defendant’s entitlement to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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“Eleventh Amendment immunity” is “convenient shorthand” for state sovereign 
immunity, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999), which, for the purposes of this 
case, renders “an unconsenting State . . . immune from liability for damages in a suit 
brought in federal court by one of its own citizens.” Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 229 
n.2 (1989) (citing the “longstanding holding” of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). 
State sovereign immunity extends to subsidiary units and individual state employees sued 
in their official capacity. See Betts, 621 F.3d at 254. A state’s immunity is not absolute, 
however, as it may be waived by state consent to suit. See M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-
Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2003). “The waiver by 
the state must be voluntary and our test for determining voluntariness is a stringent one.” 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Druz contends that the State Defendants waived any immunity by consenting to 
suit when the New Jersey School Boards Association Insurance Group (“NJSBIG”) sued 
Druz in 1988 for allegedly mishandling a securities account while working as a financial 
consultant. According to Druz, the original suit by NJSBIG, the subsequent criminal 
investigation, the ethical investigation by the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics 
(“NJOAE”), the arbitration proceedings, and Druz’s current suit—for malicious 
prosecution, conspiracy, and “wrongful infliction of emotional distress”—are all one 
“continuous” proceeding. 
We agree with the District Court that “[t]he instant case is clearly a separate 
proceeding” and the issues presented here “are completely unrelated to the issues 
litigated” in 1988. App. 13. The 1988 litigation concerned the alleged mishandling of a 
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securities account, whereas this case revolves around whether DAG Noto acted with legal 
malice by informing the NJOAE of the criminal indictment. Indeed, the District Court 
cited Druz’s own previous representation that the malicious prosecution “is a separate 
and independent action” from the state litigation. N.J. Sch. Bds. Ass’n Ins. Grp. v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 111 F. App’x 141, 142 (3d Cir. 2004). Although the NJSBIG 
waived its immunity in the 1988 litigation, the current proceeding is a separate action 
involving a different agency. The State Defendants did not consent to this suit and we 
hold that they entertain sovereign immunity. 
Regarding DAG Noto in her personal capacity, the District Court determined that 
Druz’s claims against her were barred by grievant/witness immunity because the claims 
were “based upon Defendants’ causing the ethics proceeding.” App. 16 (quoting Pl. Br. 
9) (emphasis in original brief). New Jersey provides absolute immunity for “all 
communications” by “[g]rievants . . . and witnesses and potential witnesses” in ethics 
matters made to the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics. N.J. Court R. 1:20-7(f). 
According to Druz, DAG Noto caused the ethics proceeding not by 
communicating his indictment to the NJOAE, but by fraudulently obtaining the 
indictment in the first place. Even accepting as true all allegations in Druz’s Complaint 
and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, e.g., W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 
Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010), Druz’s claims relate to the ethics 
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proceeding, not the underlying indictment.
2
 Because he seeks to hold DAG Noto liable 
on theories of tort and civil rights for the ethics proceeding, the District Court did not err 
in determining that DAG Noto had absolute immunity for her communications to the 
NJOAE. 
We hold that the State Defendants had Eleventh Amendment immunity and DAG 
Noto had absolute witness immunity. The District Court committed no error in granting 
the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 
We have considered all contentions presented by the parties and conclude that no 
further discussion is necessary. 
 The judgment of the District Court will be AFFIRMED.          
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 Indeed, any claim related to the underlying indictment secured in 1992 is long barred by 
the statute of limitations. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:47A-2 (West 2010) (two-year 
limitation on malicious prosecution). 
